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1. INTRODUCTION
First of all, I want to say that Professor Govier contributed to the study of conceptual
structures by writing a very insightful and simulating paper about the dichotomous
framework and the ways uses of that framework may go awry. The case of claims of
dichotomy (exclusive disjunctions) illustrates how the choices of logical tools are
connected, sometimes quite unexpectedly, with larger issues about human thought and
culture. In the history of logic there has been a long-term, rather unfortunate, prejudice in
favor of the exclusiveness of disjunctions. As Else Barth noted (1974, p. 418),
“practically all traditional logicians regarded the notion of exclusive disjunction as a
more important logical tool than that of inclusive disjunction.” Thus, there is a particular
value attached to getting clear about the mode of thought here analysed by Professor
Govier.
In what follows I shall briefly comment on three issues: the ways one may argue
fallaciously starting from an inclusive disjunction (A v B); the ways one may do it
starting from an exclusive disjunction (A # B); and the ways one may block, at an early
stage, the slippery journey described at the end of the paper.
2. INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION
Professor Govier mentions two interesting ways of reasoning fallaciously from an
premise A v B (or, for all x: Ax v Bx). One way would be to start from a disjunctive
premise that is flawed (but superficially plausible), the other to use a fallacious rule of
inference, in particular one that takes the inclusive disjunction to yield the same
conclusions as an exclusive one (both errors could be combined).
The first case would fall under the fallacy of problematic premise, but Govier
rightly points out that, since the premise flaw could be covered up by the trappings of
rigorous logic in what follows (say a disjunctive syllogism or a constructive dilemma),
one may in some cases speak of a quasi-logical argument. This, of course, does not mean
that there is anything wrong with these logical rules of inference. But the point is that also
valid rules of logic can be misused. When logic is misused in this way, covering up a
flawed inclusive disjunction, this may be called a fallacy of false dilemma.
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The second case could in some instances, where the linguistic conventions about
the ways to express inclusive and exclusive disjunctions permit so, be construed as a case
of equivocation. However, the inference from inclusive to exclusive disjunction being
invalid, it may also be construed as a non sequitur. In fact, the case adduced by Govier (A
v B, B; therefore – A) much resembles the one of asserting the consequent (a standard
example of non sequitur), since A v B is equivalent to – A > B. This invalid inference
may be confused with another, valid, inference that one obtains by substituting an
exclusive disjunction for the inclusive one (A # B, B; therefore – A). This latter rule of
inference was known to the Stoics and bears the traditional name of modus ponendo
tollens.
3. EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION
With exclusive disjunctions, or claims of dichotomy, we have again the same ways of
reasoning fallaciously: the disjunctive premise could be flawed or the rule of inference
used could be (or both). Govier concentrates on the ways the premise could be flawed.
She distinguishes six ways in which this could come about. The first three ways are ways
in which the claim of dichotomy could actually be false (as I would say), whereas the
other ways are ways in which the claim could fail to be true, or to be knowable, without
being false.
Now, since a dichotomous claim can be written as the conjunction of a claim of
exhaustiveness and a claim of exclusiveness, it can be false because of a lack of
exhaustiveness, or a lack of exclusiveness or both (Govier’s (i), (ii), and (iii)). This is true
for the cases where we consider claims that are modalized (necessarily (A # B)), or
generalized (for all x: Ax # Bx), or both (necessarily for all x: Ax # Bx). For instance,
‘necessarily for all x: Ax # Bx’ can be false because ‘necessarily for all x: Ax v Bx’ is
false (lack of exhaustiveness), or because ‘necessarily for all x: – (Ax . Bx)’ is false (lack
of exclusiveness), or because both are false. However, if no modalization or
generalization is present (A # B), the last possibility is excluded, since A v B
(exhaustiveness) and – (A . B) (exclusiveness) can not both be false. So, in that case,
there are only two ways to be false, corresponding to those two lines in the truth table
where the exclusive disjunction is false.
Clearly Govier includes the generalized case, since she seems to be concerned
primarily with predicates, rather than statements (cf. her note 5). It is not so clear whether
she also has the modalized cases in mind, though her use of ‘must’ and ‘can’ suggests
that she does (but formulas are unmodalized). Somehow the importance of modality
seems a bit underplayed.
Govier goes on to point out three other ways a dichotomous claim could be false.
I must admit that I see no other ways it could be false, though I am happy to agree that
there are other ways in which it could fail to be true. So perhaps our only difference
regards the use of the word ‘false’. Govier’s fourth way (ill-formedness) makes, I would
say, the dichotomy indefinite, rather than true or false. I’m thinking here in terms of a
three-valued logic, where statements are assigned the value ‘indefinite’ in cases of
vagueness or referential failure (Blau 1978). Ill-formedness (lack of clarity) can be seen
as a special case of vagueness. The same holds of Govier’s fifth way ( off-spectrumness),
which is a kind of category mistake and, therefore, can also be classified as a kind of
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vagueness (Blau 1978, p. 57). These are important ways in which dichotomous
statements can fail to be true.
About Govier’s sixth case (indeterminacy), however, I disagree. There are of
course philosophical positions in which being true is dependent upon being specifiable or
knowable, but common sense points in another direction. For instance, if from a huge urn
filled with marbles I shovel out about a thousand and then immediately shovel them back
in, before even the Rain Man can count them, or anyway before anyone has in fact
counted them, the parity (odd or even) of the number of marbles that have been out is
completely unknowable (according to common sense). Yet, it is (also according to
common sense) true to say that this number was either odd or even. The speckled hen
case may be a case of vagueness again, and hence a case of indefiniteness, but in many
cases of indeterminacy dichotomous claims can be true, though it be beyond us to
ascertain which of the disjuncts is the true one.
4. GETTING ON THE SLIPPERY JOURNEY
Towards the end of her paper Professor Govier develops a fascinating series of steps
going from mere difference to de-humanization. Here it is important to investigate the
logical means that may enable us to criticize and block this “slippery journey” at various
stages. I shall comment only on the early stages: from difference to exclusive disjunction.
Notice first that if we restrict ourselves to two-valued logic and neither modality nor
generalization is involved, difference (which would have to be expressed by – (A iff B),
this being the denial of extensional equality) and exclusive disjunction (A # B) are
logically equivalent. So the step from difference to dichotomy is actually valid for this
case. In the other cases, where we have modality or generalization or both, one needs
first to establish either the exclusiveness (leading to “early exclusion”) and then the
exhaustiveness, or one has to do that in the opposite order. The critic may, of course try
to criticize the very first step, or even that there is a difference. Otherwise, if one moves
illegitimately from early exclusion to exhaustiveness, this may be criticized as an “error
of contrariety” (see paper, p. 4); if one moves illegitimately from (early) exhaustiveness
to exclusiveness, this may be criticized as the error of mistaking an inclusive disjunction
for an exclusive one (p. 2). So, in both cases, Professor Govier’s paper provides a way for
the critic to try and block the slippery slope at an early stage. This is good, for if one can
block it at an early stage there is no need to get involved in discussions about what errors
or prejudices come in at the later stages. Only when the dichotomy has been established,
need the critic consider further options.
link to paper
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